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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the federal estate, gift, and generation-skipping
transfer taxes have come under sustained attack. Opponents have
launched an all-out campaign to abolish the wealth transfer taxes,
branding them as unfair, counterproductive, and even immoral. The
abolitionist cause has gained substantial support among the general
public and in Congress. In 1999 and again in 2000, Congress voted to
repeal the estate tax, though both attempts ended, predictably, with a
presidential veto.1 During the 2000 presidential campaign, then-
candidate George W. Bush aligned himself with the abolitionists, and
with the inauguration of the Bush administration in 2001 the prospect
of estate tax repeal became real. Promptly after assuming office,
President Bush, emboldened by a favorable budget outlook, proposed
a program of massive tax cuts with estate tax repeal as a central
component. Congress acted expeditiously on the proposal, and on
June 7, 2001, President Bush signed the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 20012 (2001 Act or Act) into law.
The 2001 Act is a remarkable piece of legislation. It promises
dramatic reductions in income and estate taxes over a nine-year
phase-in period, culminating in 2010 with complete repeal of the
estate tax and introduction of a new carryover basis regime for
inherited property.3 Interestingly, though, it retains the gift tax even
after repeal of the estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes. By
far the most arresting feature of the Act is the "sunset" provision,
which automatically terminates the Act's substantive changes at the
4
end of 2010 and reinstates prior law for 2011 and subsequent years.In effect, the sunset provision transforms the Act's large-scale tax cuts
I See Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 601;
Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. 8, 106th Cong. § 101.
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
3 See id. §§ 501 (terminating estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes after
2009), 541 (terminating deathtime basis step-up after 2009), 542 (introducing
carryover basis for property acquired from a decedent after 2009).
4 See id. § 901(b) (reinstating prior law for 2011 and subsequent years "as if [the
2001 Act] had never been enacted"). This provision was added in the conference
agreement to avoid a procedural challenge under the Senate's "Byrd Rule," which
requires a 60% supermajority for legislation that affects revenues beyond the ten-year
budget horizon. See William G. Gale & Samara R. Potter, An Economic Evaluation
of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 55 NAT'L TAX J.
133, 137 (2002). The conference agreement passed the Senate by a 58-33 vote, two
votes short of the sixty votes that would have been necessary to waive the Byrd Rule.
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into a temporary measure and leaves open the question of whether to
make those cuts permanent.
Virtually no one expects to see the estate tax in its current form
spring back into force in 2011.' Instead, the 2001 Act is best viewed as
an unstable truce between two contending political camps: on one
hand, the root-and-branch tax-cutters who are determined to abolish
the estate tax permanently, in several strokes if the goal cannot be
achieved all at once; and on the other hand, skeptics who concede the
need for estate tax reform but balk at outright repeal. Both camps
6have introduced bills staking out their respective positions, and the
outcome of the battle over the future of the estate tax remains
uncertain. In the meantime, political and economic developments
have already begun to reshape the estate tax debate. Volatility in
capital markets, a deteriorating economic outlook, and the looming
threat of international terrorism have contributed to a pervasive
atmosphere of uncertainty. The hefty budget surpluses projected at
the beginning of 2001 have evaporated and turned into deficits.
Nevertheless, as changed circumstances prompt a widespread
rethinking of national priorities, abolitionists in the Bush
administration and in Congress continue to press for permanent estate
tax repeal. Indeed, this appears to be the first administration ever to
launch a major war effort by attacking the federal taxation of
inherited property
In this article, we consider the implications of repealing the estate
tax and replacing it with a carryover basis regime, assuming for the
sake of argument that the 2001 Act's treatment of property
transferred at death may become permanent through repeal of the
5 See Gale & Potter, supra note 4, at 138 ("Virtually no one believes the bill will
sunset as written.").
6 Compare Tax Relief Guarantee Act of 2002, H.R. 586, 107th Cong.
(proposing repeal of sunset provision for entire 2001 Act), and Permanent Death Tax
Repeal Act of 2002, H.R. 2143, 107th Cong. (proposing repeal of sunset provision for
estate tax provisions), with H.R. 5008, 107th Cong. (2002) (proposing retention of
wealth transfer taxes with $3,500,000 exemption and 50% top marginal rate).
7 The modern estate tax was enacted in 1916, during the military buildup for
World War I. Throughout the nation's early history, federal estate or inheritance
taxes were imposed "primarily to finance wars or the threat of war." STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 107th Cong., DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF PRESENT LAW
AND PROPOSALS RELATING TO FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 10-11 (Joint
Comm. Print 2001); see also William G. Gale & Joel Slemrod, Overview, in
RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 1, 14 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001)
("Like its precursors, the modern estate tax originated in a time of war preparation, if
not war itself.").
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sunset provision. The concept of carryover basis for inherited
property is not new, but it has a checkered past. A previous
experiment with carryover basis, enacted in 1976 and terminated a few
years later,8 has been described as "one of the greatest legislative
fiascoes in the history of the income tax." 9 In coupling carryover basis
with repeal of the estate tax, the 2001 Act marks a major departure
from the 1976 Act, but it remains to be seen whether the new
carryover basis regime will prove more effective or long-lived than its
predecessor.' °
In Part II, we examine the revenue and distributional impact of
estate tax repeal, before turning in the remaining parts to a closer
analysis of the 2001 Act's substantive provisions concerning gifts and
bequests. Part III discusses the scope and structure of the new
carryover basis regime, focusing on the exemptions that allow a
deathtime basis step-up for large amounts of appreciated property in
even the wealthiest estates. Part IV explores problems of
implementation and raises questions about the practicability of the
new carryover basis regime. Part V examines the notion of retaining a
gift tax in the absence of an estate tax and argues that this aspect of
the Act is unlikely to remain in force. The conclusion offers a critical
assessment of the Act's carryover basis regime as an alternative to the
current estate tax.
II. WINNERS AND LOSERS
Proponents of the 2001 Act have portrayed the tax cuts as
affordable and necessary to stimulate a faltering economy while
emphasizing that the Act provides across-the-board tax cuts for
households at all income levels." These claims, however, are
8 See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1520, 1872-77
(adding former section 1023) [hereinafter former I.R.C. § 1023]. The carryover basis
provisions of the 1976 Act were amended in 1978 and ultimately repealed with
retroactive effect in 1980. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 515, 92
Stat. 2763, 2884 (amending former section 1023); Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401(a), 94 Stat. 229, 299 (repealing former section
1023).
9 Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VAND. L. REV. 361, 365 (1993).
10 For a general discussion of carryover basis and a comparison with a deathtime
gains tax, see Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Death Without Taxes?, 20
VA. TAX REV. 499 (2001).
11 In his 2001 State of the Union address, President Bush announced, "In my
plan, no one is targeted in or targeted out. Everyone who pays income taxes will get
relief." Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Administration Goals, 37
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incomplete and misleading. Estate tax repeal, even if coupled with a
carryover basis regime, represents a major windfall for a small group
of very high-income taxpayers and does nothing to stimulate
consumption in the short term. Even in the long term, the effects of
estate tax repeal on work effort, saving, and investment remain
uncertain." Moreover, if the sunset provision is repealed and the tax
cuts become permanent, as the abolitionists urge, the resulting
revenue losses will exacerbate an increasingly dire long-term budget
outlook." As the revenue and distributional implications of the Act
become clearer, the abolitionist agenda may lose much of its initial
populist appeal.
A. Disappearing Surplus
In January 2001, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
projected a unified budget surplus of $5.6 trillion for fiscal years 2002-
2011.14 Promptly after taking office, President Bush announced his
intention to use a large portion of the surplus to pay for an ambitious
program of tax cuts that eventually came to fruition in the 2001 Act.
He portrayed the proposed tax cuts as prudent 5 and insisted that they
would leave ample room in the budget to protect social security trust
funds, to pay down outstanding federal debt, and to provide a residual
fund for unexpected needs. 16 At first glance, the projected $5.6 trillion
surplus may seem more than adequate to pay for $1.35 trillion of tax
cuts, even after subtracting the $2.5 trillion "off-budget" social
security surplus. On closer examination, however, the budget outlook
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 351, 354-55 (Feb. 27, 2001) [hereinafter State of the
Union]; see also Remarks on Signing the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 858, 858 (June 7, 2001)
(describing the 2001 Act as "[a]cross the board tax relief").
12 See Gale & Slemrod, supra note 7, at 43-50.
See Gale & Potter, supra note 4, at 133 (describing the 2001 Act as "not
fiscally sustainable").
14 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 107TH CONG., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2002-2011, at 2 tbl.l-1 (2001).
" See State of the Union, supra note 11, at 354 (stating that "[w]e should
approach our Nation's budget as any prudent family would," asserting that "the
growing surplus exists because taxes are too high and Government is charging more
than it needs," and describing proposed tax cuts as "just right" - not "too big," not
"too small").
16 See id. at 352, 354 (insisting that the proposal would "protect[] all $2.6 trillion
of the Social Security surplus" and permit the government "to pay down $2 trillion in
debt during the next 10 years" while maintaining "a contingency fund for emergencies
or additional spending needs").
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appears far bleaker than the CBO projections might seem to suggest,
and the effects of the Act are likely to make matters even worse in the
long term.
In projecting a $5.6 trillion surplus, the CBO does not purport to
offer a realistic forecast or prediction of future outcomes." This is not
to suggest that the CBO projections are inaccurate or unreliable, but
merely that they are constructed for a specific purpose and should be
used with care."8 To put the CBO projections in perspective, it is
helpful to note that they are constrained by a ten-year budget horizon,
which ignores more remote conditions and events. Thus, the
projected short-term surplus should be considered in the context of
the long-term "fiscal gap" resulting from projected deficits beyond the
ten-year horizon.19 This point is particularly telling in the case of
social security revenues and expenditures, which are included in the
unified budget projections on a cash-flow basis.20  Since annual
program revenues (primarily from payroll tax collections) currently
exceed expenditures (primarily for benefits), the resulting surpluses
account for a substantial portion - nearly $2.5 trillion - of the
projected $5.6 trillion unified budget surplus for fiscal years 2002-
2011. If current policies remain unchanged, the social security trustfunds are expected to start running annual deficits as large numbers of
17 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 107TH CONG., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2002-2011, at 7 (noting that CBO baseline "is not 'realistic,'
because tax and spending policies will change over time," nor is it "intended to be a
forecast of future budgetary outcomes").
18 The CBO baseline serves as "a neutral benchmark that the Congress can use
to measure the effects of proposed changes in spending and revenue policies," and is
constructed according to prescribed rules. Id. at 5. For detailed analysis and criticism
of the CBO baseline, see Alan J. Auerbach et al., The Budget Outlook and Options
for Fiscal Policy, 95 TAX NOTES 1639, 1640-48, 1644 n.4 (June 10, 2002) (noting that
criticisms are leveled not at the CBO per se but at "the laws that guide the formation
of the baseline budget and dictate how that budget should be used"); cf. Robert D.
Reischauer, Framing the Budget Debate for the Future, Testimony Before the Senate
Budget Committee 3 (Jan. 29, 2002) (statement on file with authors) ("Rarely have
the policies underlying the baseline projections been as disconnected from the policy
makers' agendas as they are today.").
19 Even before the 2001 Act, the CBO projected a long-term fiscal gap of 0.8%
through 2070. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 107TH CONG., THE LONG-TERM BUDGET
OUTLOOK 9 (2000); see also Alan J. Auerbach & William G. Gale, Tax Cuts and the
Budget, 90 TAx NOTES 1869, 1874 (Mar. 26, 2001) (projecting similar fiscal gap of
0.7%).
20 See Auerbach et al., supra note 18, at 1644-45.
21 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 107TH CONG., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2002-2011, at 2 tbl.1-1.
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baby boomers reach retirement age and eventually to run short of
sufficient funds to pay promised benefits in full.22 Nevertheless, since
the long-term shortfalls occur beyond the ten-year budget horizon,
they are not reflected in the CBO projections. In view of the
overwhelming popularity of social security (and the difficulty of
implementing structural reform), it would make sense either to take
the long-term shortfalls into account or at least to back out the short-
term social security surplus from the ten-year budget projections in
order to make a realistic assessment of the affordability of proposed
tax cuts.
23
Another crucial assumption underlying the CBO projections is
that "current laws continue without change., 24 Thus, the law, as it
exists at the beginning of the ten-year budget period, is assumed to
remain effective and unchanged throughout the period.25 The 2001
Act includes several gimmicks designed to exploit this assumption and
minimize the revenue loss shown in budget projections.2  For
example, the Act phases in tax cuts over a nine-year period27 and loads
28a disproportionately large share of the cuts into the later years. The
full cost of the Act becomes apparent only in 2010 when all the cuts
22 See BD. OF TRUSTEES, FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND
DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2002) (projecting
annual deficits beginning in 2017 and insolvency in 2041).
23 See Auerbach et al., supra note 18, at 1644-45 (arguing for similar treatment of
medicare and other retirement programs).
24 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 107TH CONG., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2002-2011, at 5.
25 This assumption, while thoroughly unrealistic, is fully consistent with the
purpose of the baseline. See id. at xviii ("CBO does not predict future legislation -
indeed, any attempt to incorporate future legislative changes in its baseline would
undermine the usefulness of those numbers as the base against which to measure the
effects of such changes.").
26 See Gale & Potter, supra note 4, at 137-38; see also Auerbach et al., supra note
18, at 1645; cf. Joel Friedman et al., New Tax-Cut Law Ultimately Costs as Much as
Bush Plan: Gimmicks Used to Camouflage $4.1 Trillion Cost in Second Decade, Ctr.
on Budget and Policy Priorities, available at http://www.cbpp.org/5-26-Oltax.htm
(June 27, 2001) (describing 2001 Act as having "more budget gimmicks than any tax
bill - and quite possibly any piece of major legislation - in recent history").
27 The phase-in period was shortened from ten years to nine years in the
conference agreement to bring the final calendar year of tax cuts within the final fiscal
year of the ten-year budget period and to avoid running afoul of the Senate's budget
rules. See supra note 4.
28 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET
EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1836 (Joint Comm. Print. 2001);
see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 107TH CONG., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2003-2012, at 47 tbl.3-2 (2002).
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are fully phased in. Since the estate tax raises a relatively small
portion of total federal revenue,29 one might expect that estate tax
repeal would add little to the cost of the Act. Indeed, projections
show relatively modest revenue losses from gradually declining estate
tax rates and increasing exemptions during the phase-in period.
Losses jump dramatically, however, with complete repeal of the estate
tax in 2010.30 When all the cuts under the Act are fully phased in,
estate tax repeal may account for nearly one-quarter of the annual
revenue loss.31 After only one year, however, the cuts are scheduled
to expire automatically under the sunset provision. Although the
CBO projections accept the sunset provision as an unchangeable
feature of current law, no one seriously expects the tax cuts to vanish
at the stroke of midnight on December 31, 2010. If, as seems likely,
the tax cuts are selectively extended or made permanent in modified
form, the cost of the Act could be substantially higher for years after
2010.
With each passing year, the ten-year budget horizon moves
forward, and the CBO projections must be updated to take account of
developments during the past year. Between January 2001 and
January 2002, the fiscal outlook deteriorated dramatically: the
projected unified budget surplus for fiscal years 2002-2011 dwindled
from $5.6 trillion to $1.6 trillion." Of the $4 trillion decline, revenue
and interest costs of the 2001 Act account for around $1.7 trillion,
29 The wealth transfer taxes raised $29 billion in 2000 and prior to the 2001 Act
were projected to raise $52 billion in 2011, representing around 1.5% of total federal
revenues. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 107TH CONG., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2002-2011, at 54 tbl.3-2.
30 The Joint Committee on Taxation projects annual revenue losses (in millions
of dollars) from the phase-in and repeal of the estate and generation-skipping transfer
taxes during fiscal years 2002-2011 as follows:
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 1 2009 2010 2011 1 Total
6,383 5,031 7,054 4,051 9,695 11,862 12,701 23,036 53,422 133,235
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET
EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1836, at 3.
31 See Len Burman, Treasury's New Distribution Presentation, 90 TAX NOTES
1889, 1889 (Mar. 26, 2001) (noting that, as originally proposed, "estate tax repeal
would amount to a $58 billion cut in 2011 alone, according to Treasury estimates,"
representing "nearly one-quarter of the total $250 billion tax cut in that year"). This
estimate seems plausible under the 2001 Act, but the calculation is complicated by the
three-month lag between fiscal and calendar years and by the nine-month lag between
a decedent's death and the due date of the estate tax return.
32 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 107TH CONG., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2003-2012, at xiv tbl.1.
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economic and technical changes for another $1.6 trillion, and
increased spending, primarily on defense and homeland security in the
wake of the September 11 attacks, for another $600 billion.33
Excluding the social security surplus, the CBO projections show that
costs of the Act exceed available revenues, producing a net deficit of
$700 billion for fiscal years 2002-2011. 34 (The projections show annual
surpluses at the end of the budget period, but those surpluses are
artificially high due to the scheduled termination of the tax cuts at the
end of 2010.) However bright the fiscal outlook may have seemed
when thetax cuts were first proposed in 2001, the evaporation of the
projected ten-year surplus within a single year should prompt even the
most zealous abolitionists to reexamine their agenda.
B. Skewed Benefits
The 2001 Act exacerbates current and long-term fiscal deficits and
at the same time provides disproportionate benefits to taxpayers at
the very top of the income scale. Proponents of the Act have taken
considerable pains to obscure the distributional effects of the tax cuts
by focusing exclusively on income tax rate reductions and resorting to
unorthodox distributional presentations. Notably, the Treasury
Department in March 2001 claimed that the proposed tax cuts would
have a distinctly progressive effect and released a distributional
analysis purporting to support that claim.35
33 See id. at xiv tbl.1; see also Auerbach et al., supra note 18, at 1641 tbl.2.
34 The CBO projections for fiscal years 2002-2011 show a $742 billion on-budget
deficit and a $2.343 trillion off-budget surplus, producing a total surplus of $1.601
trillion. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 107TH CONG., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2003-2012, at xv tbl.2. These figures reflect a $1.275 trillion
revenue loss attributable to the 2001 Act. See id. at xiv tbl.1. If the medicare surplus
(as well as the social security surplus) is excluded, the total deficit rises to $1.1 trillion.
See Auerbach et al., supra note 18, at 1640-41.
35 According to the Treasury's press release:
The share of income tax relief provided to families with incomes under
$100,000 is larger than their share of current income taxes paid .... As a
result, these families will pay a smaller share of the total income tax burden
under the President's proposal than they do under current law. Conversely,
the share of the income tax relief provided to families with incomes of
$100,000 or more is smaller than their share of current income taxes paid.
As a result, these families will pay a larger share of the total income tax
burden under the President's proposal than they do under current law.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, Treasury Releases
Distribution Table for the President's Tax Relief Plan (Mar. 8, 2001). For the
accompanying distributional analysis, see Press Release, Office of Tax Analysis, U.S.
Estate Tax Repeal
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The Treasury analysis, however, is misleading in several material
respects. First, it departs from the standard method of classifying
households across the income distribution. Instead of using income
quintiles, with further differentiation in the top quintile, the Treasury
analysis divides households into fixed-dollar income groups, making it
difficult to determine how evenly benefits are distributed across the
36entire set of households. Second, in presenting the impact of the tax
cuts on each income group, the Treasury analysis rejects the standard
measure of percentage change in after-tax income, which is widely
regarded as "the best measure of the change in a family's well-
being., 7  Instead, the Treasury analysis shows each income group's
share of the total change in individual income taxes and percentage
change in income tax liability, which make the tax cuts for low-income
households appear relatively large.38 Finally, the Treasury analysis
provides data concerning the Act's major income tax provisions but
completely ignores the effects of repealing the estate tax while leaving
the flat-rate payroll taxes unchanged.39 Although the estate tax has
not always been included in analyzing the distributional effects of
Dep't of the Treasury, Major Individual Income Tax Provisions of the President's Tax
Proposal, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/distributionrel.htm
(Mar. 8, 2001). For a similar analysis of the 2001 Act, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 107TH CONG., DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE
AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1836 (Joint Comm. Print 2001).
36 See Burman, supra note 31, at 1889-90; see also Julie-Anne Cronin, U.S.
Treasury Distributional Analysis Methodology, in 85 OTA PAPERS 34 (1999) (noting
that a quintile table conveys a family's relative position in the total income
distribution more clearly than a fixed-dollar table, and also facilitates comparisons of
tables using different income measures).
37 Cronin, supra note 36, at 3; see also Gale & Potter, supra note 4, at 147 ("A
tax cut or increase that gives everyone the same percentage change in take-home
income is distributionally neutral - it holds the distribution of after-tax income
constant before and after the policy change.").
31 See Cronin, supra note 36, at 34 (noting that "a given proposal can appear
progressive when considering only the total change in tax burdens.., or the
percentage change in tax burdens.., but regressive when considering the percentage
change in after-tax income"). For example, a $10 income tax cut for a family with $10
of income tax liability shows up as a 100% reduction, while a $1,000 income tax cut
for a family with $10,000 of income tax liability shows up as a 10% reduction. See
Burman, supra note 31, at 1892.
39 See Burman, supra note 31, at 1890-91. Repealing the highly progressive
estate tax while leaving the flat-rate payroll tax unchanged makes the overall tax
system less progressive. See id. at 1891; see also Cronin, supra note 36, at 3 ("An
analysis which omitted the payroll tax would yield the incorrect conclusion that the
poor, on average, bear no federal tax burden.").
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40income tax changes, the omission seems indefensible in the case of a
proposal to repeal the estate tax entirely, especially given the
proposal's disproportionate benefit for households at the top of the
income distribution. Such a tendentious presentation reveals more
about the tactics of the Act's proponents than about the distributional
effects of the tax cuts.
4
'
1
A more complete analysis, using standard assumptions and taking
the full range of income, estate, and payroll taxes into account,
indicates that the Act (when fully phased in) "raises after-tax income
by 6.3 percent for households in the top 1 percent of the income
distribution, compared to 2.8 percent or less for other groups and less
fhan 1 percent for the bottom quintile," thereby exacerbatingS 41
inequalities in the distribution of after-tax income. Moreover, estate
tax repeal in 2010 may account for more than one-third of the tax cuts
for the top 1% of the income distribution.
Repeal of the estate tax has a substantial impact on the
distribution of tax benefits under the 2001 Act. The estate tax burden
40 This may be due to uncertainty concerning whether the burden of the estate
tax falls on the transferor or the recipient. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 107TH CONG., DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE
AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1836, at 1-6 (presenting distributional effects of the 2001 Act
and noting that "estate and gift taxes are not included due to uncertainty concerning
the incidence of these taxes"). The Treasury Department added estate and gift taxes
to its distributional analyses in 1998, employing the assumption that the burden is
borne by transferors. See Cronin, supra note 36, at 32. In any event, the question of
incidence should make little difference for distributional analysis to the extent that
transferors and recipients have comparable family income. See id.; see also William
G. Gale & Joel B. Slemrod, A Matter of Life and Death: Reassessing the Estate and
Gift Tax, 88 TAX NOTES 927, 930 (Aug. 14, 2000) (noting that controversy over
incidence should not significantly affect the implications for progressivity, since
"recipients of estates tend to have very high income and wealth themselves").
41 This characterization is not intended to cast any doubt on the accuracy of the
data or the integrity of the "nonpartisan professional staff" in the Office of Tax
Analysis who compiled them. Burman, supra note 31, at 1889; cf. Martin A. Sullivan,
How to Read Tax Distribution Tables, 90 TAX NOTES 1747, 1754 (March 26, 2001)
(describing the Treasury table as "nothing more than low-grade campaign
propaganda reproduced on Treasury letterhead").
42 Gale & Potter, supra note 4, at 147. Alternative measures reveal a similarly
skewed distribution of benefits. See id. (noting that top 1% of income distribution
receives 36.7% of the total tax reduction and a decrease in federal tax liability of
more than 11%).
43 See id. ("Both the income and estate tax contribute significantly to benefits for
the top 1 percent [of the income distribution]. Estate tax repeal raises after-tax
income by 2.3 percent, while the income tax cuts raise after-tax income by 4 percent,
more than the total tax cut for any other group.").
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is heavily concentrated in the top 1% of the income distribution,
44
making it "the most progressive tax instrument currently at the
federal government's disposal. 45 It follows, therefore, that estate tax
repeal will benefit households at the top of the income distribution
and correspondingly skew the distribution of benefits under the Act.
Furthermore, the growing concentration of pre-tax income and wealth
over the past twenty years may suggest a need for more rather than
less progressivity in the tax system. 46 From a broader perspective, the
distributional effects of repealing the estate tax will ultimately depend
on a host of tax and spending policies that may shift costs from the
rich to the poor (e.g., by cutting social programs that benefit primarily
low-income families) or from current generations to future
generations (e.g., by incurring long-term debt to finance current
spending). 47 As the budget outlook deteriorates and the distributional
effects of the Act become clearer, it is time to consider alternatives to
permanent repeal of the estate tax.
C. Alternatives
The 2001 Act does not simply repeal the estate tax, for such a
measure would open a "gaping loophole" in the income tax in the
form of an unlimited deathtime basis step-up for appreciated
property.48 One possible response would be to repeal the basis step-
up allowed under current law and extend the income tax to reach
unrealized gains at death. A deathtime gains tax would be imposed at
lower rates and on a smaller base than the current estate tax;
4 One recent study estimates the distribution of federal estate and income taxes
as follows:
Estate and gift taxes Individual income tax
Top 20% 99.2% 76.6%
Top 10% 96.2% 61.3%
Top 5% 91.0% 49.1%
Top 1% 64.2% 29.5%
See Cronin, supra note 36, at 24 tbl.12.
45 William G. Gale & Joel Slemrod, Rhetoric and Economics in the Estate Tax
Debate, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 613, 616 (2001).
46 See Gale & Slemrod, supra note 7, at 29.
47 See Gale & Potter, supra note 4, at 143-45, 164-66 (discussing possible effects
of tax cuts on government expenditures); see also C. Eugene Steuerle, The 2001 Tax
Legislation from a Long-Term Perspective, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 427, 429-31 (2001).
48 Gale & Slemrod, supra note 7,at 55.
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therefore, such a tax would produce considerably less revenue. 49 Also,
in the absence of large exemptions, which would reduce revenue even
further, a deathtime gains tax would likely be substantially less
progressive than the current estate tax.50 Though seriously proposed
and extensively discussed," a deathtime gains tax has generated no
political support in Congress.
Instead, the 2001 Act replaces the estate tax with a new carryover
basis regime for inherited property. Revenue estimates for any
carryover basis regime depend crucially on the timing of gain
realizations, which in turn is extremely uncertain. Even a watertight
carryover basis regime would raise significantly less revenue than a
deathtime gains tax because it would permit indefinite deferral of gain
for beneficiaries who could afford to postpone selling inherited
property.52 Furthermore, the carryover basis provisions of the Act,
laden with large exemptions, will probably raise negligible amounts of
revenue and make only a token contribution to the progressivity of
the overall tax system.53
49 A generic deathtime gains tax might raise around 20% to 25% as much
revenue as the current estate tax. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 107TH CONG., BUDGET
OPTIONS 421 (2001) (estimating revenue from deathtime gains tax of $43.4 billion for
2002-2006 and $86.4 billion for 2002-2011); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 107TH CONG.,
THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2002-2011, at 66 tbl.3-11
(2001) (projecting estate and gift tax revenue of $174 billion for 2002-2006 and $402
billion for 2002-2011).
50 A recent study suggests that a deathtime gains tax with exemptions for marital
bequests and $250,000 of gain on a principal residence would produce a lower tax
liability than the current estate tax for 95% of decedents with a net worth of more
than $1,000,000, but would leave the tax liability roughly unchanged for decedents
with a net worth of $1,000,000 or less who would otherwise be subject to estate tax.
See James M. Poterba & Scott Weisbenner, The Distributional Burden of Taxing
Estates and Unrealized Capital Gains at Death, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION 422,447-48 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001).
51 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 91ST CONG., TAX REFORM
STUDIES AND PROPOSALS 331-51 (Comm. Print 1969); Michael J. Graetz, Taxation of
Unrealized Gains at Death: An Evaluation of the Current Proposals, 59 VA. L. REV.
830 (1973); Zelenak, supra note 9; Burke & McCouch, supra note 10.
52 A generic carryover basis regime might raise around 7% to 13% as much
revenue as the current estate tax. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 107TH CONG., BUDGET
OPrIONS 422 (2001) (estimating revenue from carryover basis of $11.5 billion for
2002-2006 and $52.5 billion for 2002-2011); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 107TH CONG.,
THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2002-2011, at 66 tbl.3-11
(2001) (projecting estate and gift tax revenue of $174 billion for 2002-2006 and $402
billion for 2002-2011).
53 See Gale & Slemrod, supra note 7, at 56 (noting that revenue from carryover
basis with generous exemptions would be "significantly smaller" than under CBO
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An obvious alternative to permanent repeal is to retain the estate
tax with larger exemptions, a broader base, and lower rates than
currently exist.54 In fact, this approach was proposed in the House
during consideration of the 2001 Act,55 and has subsequently been
offered as a possible solution to the impasse over the Act's sunset
56provision. While precise levels of rates and exemptions are
inevitably subject to negotiation and compromise in the legislative
process, it seems clear that with a few incremental adjustments, the
current estate tax could be scaled back to reach a very small number
of extremely large estates at a relatively modest sacrifice of revenue.
Recent data on estate tax returns filed in 2000 are" revealing in this
respect. Of the 52,000 taxable estate tax returns filed in that year,
those showing gross estates of $5,000,000 or more - the top 7% -
reported more than half of the total estate tax, and those showing
gross estates of $2,500,000 or more - the top 18% - reported nearly
three-quarters of the total estate tax.57  Thus, raising the estate tax
projections); Leonard Burman, Comment, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION 450, 455 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001) (noting that a carryover basis
regime with large exclusions "could actually discourage realization of capital gains -
costing individual income tax revenue as well as estate taxes"). In the absence of
wealth transfer taxes, a carryover basis regime could also lead to widespread income
tax avoidance. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Mitchell M. Gans, Wealth Transfer Tax
Repeal: Some Thoughts on Policy and Planning, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 569, 574-76 (2001).
54 For a thoughtful discussion of additional estate tax reforms, see William J.
Turnier, Three Equitable Taxpayer-Friendly Reforms of Estate and Gift Taxation, 87
TAX NOTES 269 (Apr. 10, 2000).
55 See H.R. REP. No. 107-37, at 194 (2001) (setting forth dissenting views of
Democratic members of House Ways and Means Committee and proposing
immediate increases in estate tax exemption).
56 See H.R. 5008, 107th Cong. (2002) (proposing retention of wealth transfer
taxes with $3,500,000 exemption and 50% top marginal rate).
57 A recent study of federal estate tax returns shows the following categories of
taxable returns and the reported net estate tax liability for 2000:
Size of gross estate Number of taxable returns Net estate tax ($000)
$600,000 up to $1,000,000 18,634 769,024
$1,000,000 up to $2,500,000 23,827 5,485,892
$2,500,000 up to $5,000,000 5,917 5,081,333
$5,000,000 up to $10,000,000 2,258 4,405,023
$10,000,000 up to $20,000,000 814 2,937,499
$20,000,000 or more 549 5,719,851
Total 52,000 24,398,622
See Barry W. Johnson & Jacob M. Mikow, Federal Estate Tax Returns, 1998-2000, 21
STAT. INCOME BULL. 133, 168 tbl.lc (2002).
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exemption to $5,000,000 would have eliminated estate tax liability for
18
all but the wealthiest 3621 decedents - 0.0015% of total deaths -
while preserving more than half the revenue generated by the current
estate tax.
By targeting the estate tax at extremely large accumulations of
inherited wealth, 9 such a proposal could quickly erode political
support for outright repeal. Perhaps for that very reason, opponents
of the estate tax have steadfastly pursued the goal of abolishing the
tax rather than reforming it. As the effects of the 2001 Act become
clearer during the extended phase-in period, a central issue to which
we now turn our attention is whether the Act's new carryover basis
regime represents a viable replacement for the estate tax.
III. CARRYOVER BASIS: ILLUSIONS AND REALITIES
On its face, the 2001 Act announces carryover basis as the general
rule for property acquired from a decedent after 2009.60 Yet this
description is misleading, or at least incomplete, in several respects.
As already noted, the new carryover basis regime is scheduled to
come into force in 2010 and then to expire one year later due to the
61
sunset provision. In some quarters, the sunset provision may be
viewed simply as a procedural quirk, a political compromise, or a
device to disguise the long-term cost of estate tax repeal.
Nevertheless, any serious assessment of the Act's carryover basis
provisions must start by assuming that those provisions might actually
take effect and remain in force indefinitely. Accordingly, for purposes
58 See Arialdi M. Minino & Betty L. Smith, Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2000,
49 NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS REPORT No. 12, at 3 tbl.A (Oct. 9, 2001) (showing
2,391,399 total United States deaths in 1999). Under current law, the 52,000 taxable
estate tax returns filed in 2000 represented around 2% of total deaths in the preceding
year. See supra note 57.
'9 See Gale & Slemrod, supra note 7, at 22-23 (noting need for more empirical
work on motives and patterns of bequests of the very wealthy, in analyzing role of
estate tax).
60 See I.R.C. § 1022(a) (providing for basis equal to lesser of decedent's adjusted
basis or fair market value at death). Technically the carryover basis rules of section
1022 apply only to "property acquired from a decedent," which includes (1) "property
acquired by bequest, devise, or inheritance, or by the decedent's estate from the
decedent;" (2) property transferred by the decedent during life to a "qualified
revocable trust," or to any other trust subject to a reserved power to alter, amend, or
terminate; and (3) property passing from the decedent by reason of death without
consideration. See I.R.C. § 1022(e). The rules do not apply to items of income in
respect of a decedent. See I.R.C. § 1022(f).
61 See supra note 4.
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of the present discussion, we disregard the sunset provision and focus
on the impact of the new carryover basis regime.
A. Disappearing Gain
Perhaps the most striking feature of the new regime is its narrow
field of application. The vast bulk of property passing from decedents
each year will continue to receive a fresh basis equal to its deathtime
fair market value, as under current law. 6' The carryover basis
provisions added by the 2001 Act will govern only a tiny fraction of
this property. This is due primarily to two large exemptions that
authorize a tax-free basis step-up for appreciated property6 3 owned by
the decedent at death.64 The first exemption allows a basis increase
for up to $1,300,00065 of unrealized appreciation in any property
owned at death. The second exemption allows a separate, additional
basis increase for up to $3,000,000 of unrealized appreciation in
property passing to the decedent's surviving spouse in qualifying
form.66 The dollar amount of each exemption is indexed for inflation
62 Cf. I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (providing basis equal to fair market value at death).
63 In the case of property with a basis greater than its fair market value at death,
basis is automatically stepped down to fair market value. See I.R.C. § 1022(a).
Certain losses that are not allowed as deductions on the decedent's final return may
nevertheless be used to increase the basis of appreciated property. See I.R.C.
§ 1022(b)(2)(C).
64 See I.R.C. § 1022(b)-(d). Property "owned by the decedent at the time of
death" (and hence potentially eligible for a basis step-up) includes (1) a portion of
property held by the decedent and another person as joint tenants with right of
survivorship (or tenants by the entirety), (2) property transferred by the decedent
during life to a "qualified revocable trust," and (3) the one-half share of community
property held by the decedent and a surviving spouse. See I.R.C. § 1022(d)(1)(A)-
(B). The decedent is not treated as owning property merely by virtue of a power of
appointment. See I.R.C. § 1022(d)(1)(B)(iii). The basis step-up is also unavailable
for certain property acquired by gift within three years of death and for interests in
certain foreign entities. See I.R.C. § 1022(d)(1)(C)-(D).
65 See I.R.C. § 1022(b). The $1,300,000 amount is increased by any unused
capital loss carryovers, net operating loss carryovers, and built-in section 165 losses.
See I.R.C. § 1022(b)(2)(C). It is unclear whether this adjustment is taken into account
before making the inflation adjustment under section 1022(d)(4). See infra note 67
and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 1022(c). Property eligible for the spousal exemption, defined as
"qualified spousal property," is essentially the same as (1) property qualifying for the
estate tax marital deduction under current law, including the terminable interest rule
("outright transfer property"), and (2) qualified terminable interest property (QTIP).
See I.R.C. § 1022(c)(3)-(5); cf I.R.C. § 2056(a), (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7).
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after 2010,67 though obviously the inflation adjustment can take effect
only if the sunset provision is repealed. Both exemptions are elective;
the decedent's executor has broad discretion to allocate the allowable
basis increase to eligible property, but no allocation can increase the
basis of property above its deathtime fair market value.6s
As a conceptual matter, it might be argued that any tax-free basis
increase at death violates the integrity of the income tax and should
not be tolerated. 69  As a practical matter, however, some sort of
limited basis step-up seems unavoidable. To require that taxpayers
identify and report every dollar of unrealized gain in estates of small
or moderate size would be unreasonably burdensome and hopelessly
unenforceable. The exemptions in the 2001 Act, however, go far
beyond the exigencies of practical administration. For example, the
amount of the $1,300,000 general exemption corresponds to the
aggregate value of property that is sheltered from estate tax by the
unified credit and the deduction for family-owned business interests
under current law.70
At first glance, it may seem reasonable to set the amount of the
deathtime basis step-up equal to the estate tax exemption, for this
makes it possible to claim that the new regime will not impose a tax
burden on taxpayers who were previously exempt from estate tax.
Such a claim may have rhetorical appeal, but it is inaccurate and
misleading. Although by and large the 2001 Act reduces taxes on
deathtime transfers, it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which
the new regime produces a heavier tax burden than current law. For
example, suppose a decedent dies leaving property with a fair market
value of $2,000,000 and a basis of $50,000, encumbered by liabilities of
$1,500,000. Under current law, the transfer is free of estate tax
because the net value falls within the estate tax exemption,71 and the
67 See I.R.C. § 1022(d)(4).
68 See I.R.C. § 1022(d)(2).
69 See Joseph M. Dodge, What's Wrong With Carryover Basis Under H.R. 8, 91
TAX NOTES 961, 963-64 (May 7, 2001).
70 Prior to the 2001 Act, the unified credit and the deduction for "qualified
family-owned business interests" allowed up to $1,300,000 of deathtime transfers to
pass free of estate tax. See I.R.C. §§ 2010(c), 2057(a)(3). The $1,300,000 amount also
appeared in an earlier carryover basis bill approved by Congress but vetoed by
President Clinton in 2000. See Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. 8, 106th
Cong. § 103 (proposing exemption for property with an "adjusted fair market value"
of $1,300,000).
71 The taxable estate (net of the $1,500,000 liability) is $500,000, which generates
an estate tax of $155,800. Assuming the decedent made no other taxable transfers,
the estate tax is fully offset by an equal amount of the unified credit. See I.R.C.
2002]
Virginia Tax Review
recipient takes the property with a stepped-up basis of $2,000,000." In
contrast, under the new regime, after a basis increase of $1,300,000,
the recipient takes the property with a basis of $1,350,000. The
transfer, of course, remains free of estate tax, but if the recipient sells
the property, the resulting gain of $650,000 will probably be taxed at a
20% rate, generating a capital gain of $130,000.
Such outcomes, of course, are relatively rare. For the vast
majority of estates that already receive a full tax-free basis step-up at
death, the 2001 Act will make little or no difference because any
unrealized appreciation will likely be eliminated by one or more
exemptions from carryover basis. But this merely leads back to more
fundamental questions concerning the size and structure of those
exemptions. Linking the size of the income tax and estate tax
exemptions may be sensible in a system where each tax complements
the other.73 With the repeal of the estate tax, however, the estate tax
exemption no longer has special relevance as a benchmark of
administrative convenience for a tax-free basis increase at death. The
$1,300,000 amount - a figure already superseded by increases in the
estate tax exemption under the 2001 Act74 - seems demonstrably
arbitrary. The $1,300,000 general exemption, together with the
$3,000,000 spousal exemption, will not merely preserve but
substantially expand the amount of property receiving a tax-free basis
step-up at death. This is arguably a step in precisely the wrong
direction, for it exacerbates the revenue costs of repealing the estate
tax and heedlessly squanders an opportunity to redress a glaring
defect in the income tax.75
The structure of the exemptions also deserves closer scrutiny.
The $1,300,000 general exemption and the $3,000,000 spousal
exemption provide basis increases by, not to, the specified dollar
amounts and accordingly apply without regard to the size of the estate1 6
or the value of the property involved. This approach stands in
§§ 2001(a)-(c), 2010, 2051, 2053(a)(3).
72 See I.R.C. § 1014(a).
73 For example, when the 1976 Act introduced carryover basis as a complement
to the newly unified gift and estate tax system, there were plausible reasons to
coordinate the income tax and estate tax provisions concerning identification and
valuation of property transferred at death. Thus, the tax-free basis step-up at death
was set equal to the $60,000 estate tax exemption then in effect. See former I.R.C §
1023(d)(1).
74 The estate tax exemption is scheduled to rise from $1,000,000 in 2002 to
$3,500,000 in 2009. See I.R.C. § 2010(c).
75 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
76 An alternative form of exemption would apply to property up to a specified
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marked contrast to the "minimum basis" approach adopted in the
1976 legislation, which allowed a basis increase only to the extent that
the specified amount exceeded the decedent's total basis in all
property owned at death. The main advantage of the minimum basis
approach stems from its inherent self-adjusting feature: the basis
increase vanishes if the decedent's total basis equals or exceeds the
specified amount,77 making it possible to target the benefit of the
exemption at small or moderate estates. In rejecting this approach,
the 2001 Act misses yet another opportunity to contain the revenue
costs of estate tax repeal.
Under the 2001 Act, with a bit of elementary planning, a married
couple can make up to $5,600,000 of unrealized appreciation
disappear from the income tax base: $4,300,000 at the death of the
first spouse (assuming optimal use of the spousal exemption), and
another $1,300,000 at the death of the surviving spouse. Note well that
these amounts refer to unrealized appreciation, not fair market value.
Given the size and composition of decedents' estates, the benefit of
the exemptions appears to be systematically skewed in favor of
taxpayers at the very top of the wealth distribution. In general, the
ratio of unrealized appreciation to the total value of property owned
at death tends to rise with net worth.78  Leaving aside personal
residences, which enjoy a separate gain exclusion under the Act,79 the
pattern is even more pronounced.80
Predictably, only a tiny fraction of decedents leave property with
value. Cf. Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. 8, 106th Cong. § 103 (providing
basis increase for property with an "adjusted fair market value" (i.e., net of secured
indebtedness) of $1,300,000).
77 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 10, at 529-31 (discussing minimum basis
approach adopted in 1976 Act).
78 According to one study, based on the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances,
unrealized capital gains at death represent 36% of the total expected value of all
estates and 56% of the total expected value of estates of $10,000,000 or more. See
Poterba & Weisbenner, supra note 50, at 439, 440 tbl.10-8.
79 Unrealized gain on a principal residence that is owned at death and
subsequently sold by the recipient will be eligible for the $250,000 gain exclusion
under section 121, as amended by the 2001 Act. See I.R.C. § 121(d)(9).
80 A recent study indicates that primary residences account for more than 90%
of unrealized appreciation in households with net worth below $500,000, and less than
4% in households with net worth of $10,000,000 or more. See Poterba & Weisbenner,
supra note 50, at 439. If those data are adjusted to exclude primary residences,
unrealized appreciation accounts for around 4% of total value in households with net
worth below $500,000, around 27% of value in households with net worth from
$1,000,000 to $5,000,000, and around 56% of value in households with net worth of
$10,000,000 or more. Cf. id. at 440 tbl.10-8.
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sufficient unrealized appreciation to make full use of the available
basis increases. For example, a decedent with a net worth of
$2,000,000 is likely, on average, to have unrealized appreciation of
around $700,000 - an amount that does not even approach the ceiling
81
on tax-free basis step-ups under the new regime. Suppose instead
that a decedent with a net worth of $10,000,000, including $5,600,000
of unrealized appreciation, leaves all the property to a surviving
spouse, who dies soon afterward leaving the property to their
82
children. In this case, the $4,300,000 basis increase at the first
spouse's death, combined with the $1,300,000 basis increase at the
surviving spouse's death, are just sufficient to exhaust the available
exemptions and to eliminate the unrealized gain without triggering
carryover basis treatment. Clearly, given the size and structure of the
exemptions, the vast majority of property transferred at death will
receive a tax-free basis step-up, and the carryover basis provisions of
the 2001 Act will apply primarily to a small number of very large
estates. Ironically, the taxpayers at the pinnacle of the wealth
distribution are best situated to defer realizing gains indefinitely,
thereby reducing the effective rate of capital gains tax to a negligible
83level. For large accumulations of dynastic wealth that can be passed
on intact for several generations, carryover basis may prove to be little
more than an illusion.
B. Rewards of Marriage
The $3,000,000 spousal exemption, which dwarfs the general
exemption in size, is especially troublesome because it lacks any
convincing policy justification and raises serious issues of fairness. 84
Under a carryover basis regime, there is generally no need for a
separate spousal exemption, since appreciated property passing from
81 See id. at 440 tbl.10-8 (showing 34.63% appreciation-to-value ratio, on
average, for estates between $1,000,000 and $5,000,000).
82 See id. at 439 (noting that unrealized appreciation represents 56% of value of
estates worth $10,000,000 or more). The example in text assumes that the property
passing to the surviving spouse has at least $3,000,000 of unrealized appreciation.
83 In effect, .deferring the realization of built-in gain is equivalent to reducing the
effective tax rate. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 105TH CONG., PERSPECTIVES ON THE
OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL ASSETS AND THE REALIZATION OF CAPITAL GAINS 10-11
(1997) (noting that "the effective tax rate on an asset that appreciates in value at 7
percent per year would be about one-half the statutory rate of 28 percent if the asset
was held for 30 years").
84 See Dodge, supra note 69, at 966 (describing spousal exemption as "contrary
to any discernable logic or policy").
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a decedent to a surviving spouse is not subject to a deathtime tax in
any event. In the absence of hardship, no special basis increase should
be allowed for property passing to the spouse.85 Indeed, it seems
anomalous to allow a special basis increase for property passing to a
surviving spouse at death, while imposing a strict carryover basis on
property passing to the spouse by gift during life.86 The most plausible
explanation for the spousal exemption in the 2001 Act is simply that it
perpetuates a preexisting advantage of spousal bequests. Under
current law, property passing from a decedent to a surviving spouse
(in qualifying form) escapes the estate tax by virtue of the marital
81deduction, yet it automatically receives a tax-free basis step-up. In a
similar vein, the 2001 Act preserves the peculiar preference for
community property under current law,88 which allows a tax-free basis
step-up for both halves of the property at the death of the first spouse,
even though only half of the value of the property is includible in the
decedent's gross estate.8' Explaining the origins of these anomalies in
current law, however, does not justify their continuation under the
new regime. 9°
The spousal exemption accentuates two objectionable features of
85 For example, the 1976 Act provided no special spousal exemption, but did
allow a basis adjustment for estate tax attributable to unrealized appreciation in
property subject to estate tax. See former I.R.C. § 1023(c). This adjustment was
intended to prevent pre-death appreciation from being subject both to an estate tax at
death and an income tax at the time of a subsequent sale. No adjustment was
necessary, however, with respect to property qualifying for a marital or charitable
deduction, since such property was not "subject to [estate] tax." See former I.R.C.
§ 1023(f)(4). With the repeal of the estate tax, the need for the adjustment also
disappears.
See I.R.C. § 1041. Lifetime gifts to a spouse ordinarily escape gift tax by
virtue of the marital deduction. See I.R.C. § 2523(a).
87 See I.R.C. §§ 1014(a), 2056.
88 The 2001 Act treats the surviving spouse's interest in community property as
"owned by, and acquired from, the decedent" and hence potentially eligible for an
elective basis step-up. See I.R.C. § 1022(d)(1)(B)(iv).
89 See I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6). See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 41.4.4, at 41-42 to
41-43 (3d ed. 2000).
90 One commentator argues that a properly designed carryover basis regime
could "level the playing field and generally extend uniform tax treatment to gifts and
bequests, spousal bequests and bequests to children, gains realized during life and
those held at death, and deaths in community property versus non-community
property states." See David Joulfaian, Choosing Between an Income Tax and a
Wealth Transfer Tax, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 629, 642 (2001). The $3,000,000 spousal
exemption and the continued preference for community property, however, ensure
that the 2001 Act will not achieve these "tax harmony objectives." Id.
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current law concerning qualified terminable interest property (QTIP).
First, in order to be eligible for a basis increase, a transfer must qualify
either as "outright transfer property" meeting the convoluted
requirements of the terminable interest rule or as QTIP.9' In effect,
by retaining QTIP as the only viable alternative to an outright
transfer, the 2001 Act encourages testators to provide the minimum
qualifying interest - a life estate - for their surviving spouses while
retaining full control over the ultimate disposition of the underlying
property. Indeed, the spousal exemption is available for an
accumulation trust for the sole benefit of the spouse or his or her
estate (which qualifies, ironically, as "outright transfer property") but
not for the traditional combination of a life estate with a presently
92
exercisable general power of appointment. Given the statistical
gender disparities in wealth and life expectancy (on average, husbands
are both wealthier and shorter-lived than wives), it comes as no
surprise that some perceive the QTIP provisions as a symbol of deep-
rooted gender inequality.93 At the same time, the large size of the
spousal exemption may encourage testators to leave more property to
their spouses at death (albeit in QTIP form) than they would do in the
94
absence of such a powerful tax incentive. The second problem with a
spousal exemption for QTIP is that the basis increase will most likely
benefit the remainder takers rather than the spouse. If the spouse
receives only a life estate, there is no assurance that the underlying
property will be sold during the spouse's life.95 In effect, the QTIP
provisions may be viewed as promoting marriage as a sort of tax
91 See I.R.C. § 1022(c)(3).
As a technical matter, the accumulation trust complies with the terminable
interest rule, but the life estate coupled with a presently exercisable general power of
appointment violates both the terminable interest rule and the QTIP requirements.
9' See Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and
Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301 (1995); see also Mary Louise
Fellows, Wills and Trusts: "The Kingdom of the Fathers", 10 L. & INEQ. 137, 156-59
(1991). For a different perspective, see Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax
Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1521, 1542-49 (1998); see also Wendy C. Gerzog,
The Illogical and Sexist QTIP Provisions: I Just Can't Say It Ain't So, 76 N.C. L. REV.
1597 (1998); Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the
Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1729 (1998).
94 The unlimited estate tax marital deduction creates a similar incentive under
current law. Accordingly, estate planners routinely draft formula marital bequests
designed to reduce the estate tax to zero at the death of the first spouse.
95 Even if a sale occurs, any gain (including the tax savings from the basis
increase) will ordinarily be allocated to principal rather than income. The spouse will
benefit only indirectly, to the extent that the sale proceeds are reinvested in higher-
yielding assets. See Dodge, supra note 69, at 966.
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shelter for the benefit of those who receive property after the death of
the surviving spouse.96
Even in the case of an outright bequest, the benefit of the spousal
exemption may be shifted to other beneficiaries through the creative
use of liabilities. If a decedent leaves encumbered property, any
liabilities in excess of basis are generally disregarded in determining
whether the decedent (or the estate) recognizes gain and in
determining the recipient's basis.97 This rule prevents the excess
liabilities from triggering an immediate income tax at death, and
leaves the recipient with a carryover basis in the encumbered
98property. By its terms, however, the rule does not prevent a basis
increase for encumbered property passing to the decedent's surviving
spouse, even though the spouse may end up bearing the burden of
liabilities incurred for the benefit of other beneficiaries. For example,
suppose H is married to W and wishes to leave $5,000,000 to their
child C. H owns property with a fair market value of $5,000,000 and a
basis of $700,000, but H does not leave the property directly to C.
Instead, he borrows $5,000,000 secured by the property and then
leaves the cash proceeds to C and the property to W. At H's death,
the property passing to W is eligible for a total basis increase of
$4,300,000 (i.e., a $1,300,000 general exemption and a $3,000,000
spousal exemption), thereby eliminating all of the built-in gain. W will
eventually bear the burden of repaying the $5,000,000 liability, leaving
her with a net benefit of zero, while C receives a tax-free bequest of
$5,000,000. As a result, the benefit of the spousal exemption is in
effect shifted to C.
Married couples also enjoy a special exemption from the anti-
abuse provisions concerning deathbed gifts. In general, the 2001 Act
disallows any basis increase at death for property that the decedent
received by gift within three years before death. 99 The evident
purpose of the three-year rule is to forestall a gift of appreciated
96 See id. at 967 (criticizing "large exemption from income tax for the collective
legatees of wealthy descendents [sic] who happen to have been married at death").
See I.R.C. § 1022(g).
98 Suppose D, who owns property with a fair market value of $10,000,000 and a
basis of $1,000,000, takes out a $10,000,000 loan secured by the property. In an
attempt to achieve a full basis step-up, D leaves the borrowed proceeds to a child by
will and the encumbered property to charity. To prevent this gambit, the 2001 Act
provides that the excess liabilities rule does not apply in the case of a transfer to a
"tax-exempt beneficiary." See id. Presumably, D (or D's estate) must recognize a
gain of $9,000,000 (less any basis increase allocated by the executor to the
encumbered property).
99 See I.R.C. § 1022(d)(1)(C).
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property by a donor to an elderly or terminally ill donee in the
expectation of reacquiring the property with a stepped-up basis at the
donee's death.'0° In contrast to its counterpart in current law,'O° the
three-year rule applies even if the property ends up in the hands of a
person other than the original holder (or the holder's spouse).
Amazingly, however, the three-year rule does not apply to property
given to the decedent by the decedent's spouse.'02  This exception
represents an open invitation to spouses to engage in basis-laundering
transactions that would be branded as abusive in any other context.
For example, if a husband is terminally ill and his wife owns
appreciated property, the wife can give the property to her husband
and (with the husband's cooperation) receive the property back from
him at death with up to $3,000,000 of gain laundered out. °3 On its
face, the three-year rule does not allow even a spouse to launder
property received by gift from a third person,'04 but the difficulty of
tracing property to its original source may render the three-year rule
unenforceable as a practical matter.
C. An Unlevel Playing Field: Pensions and Life Insurance
The 2001 Act continues the provisions of current law governing
income in respect of a decedent (IRD). Very generally, IRD refers to
items of income accrued or to which the decedent became entitled
during life but not realized before death for income tax purposes.
Common examples include accrued but unpaid salary, interest, or
dividends.' 6 By far the most important category of IRD consists of
100 Although by its terms the rule refers only to gifts received within three years
of death, it also applies to bequests, since property acquired from a decedent is
"treated [for income tax purposes] as transferred by gift." I.R.C. § 1022(a)(1).
101 See I.R.C. § 1014(e) (disallowing basis step-up for property reacquired from
decedent by donor who gave property to decedent within one year before death).
102 See I.R.C. § 1022(d)(1)(C)(ii). Nevertheless, the spousal exception does not
apply to property that the spouse acquired by gift during the three-year period. This
qualification is necessary to prevent the use of the spouse as a conduit to achieve a
basis step-up for property originally owned by third persons.
103 See David R. Hodgman, Carryover Basis: Planning and Drafting Issues, 28
EST. PLAN. 611, 613 (2001).
104 See I.R.C. §1022(d)(1)(C)(ii).
105 Similar tracing problems arise in determining the source of contributions to
property held in joint tenancy. See I.R.C. § 1022(d)(1)(B)(i)(II). Unlike the current
estate tax provisions, the 2001 Act contains no express presumption concerning the
source of contributions. Cf. I.R.C. § 2040(a).
106 See Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b) (as amended in 1965). See generally BORIS I.
BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 22:187
2002]
tax-deferred retirement benefits (i.e., qualified pension plans and
individual retirement accounts) payable to the decedent's estate or to
designated beneficiaries. To prevent bunching of income on the
decedent's final return, current law generally requires that the
recipient step into the decedent's shoes and include IRD in gross
income in the year of receipt.0 7 As a corollary, IRD is ineligible for
the deathtime basis step-up allowed for other property.'08
The 2001 Act expressly carves out all items of IRD from the
scope of the new carryover basis regime, 1°9 thereby preventing such
items from receiving any basis increase and ensuring that they remain
subject to the step-in-the-shoes provisions of current law. On one
hand, this rigorous approach makes sense as a means of preserving the
integrity of the provisions governing distributions of tax-deferred
retirement benefits and preventing tax deferral from being converted
to tax forgiveness."0 On the other hand, the treatment of IRD cannot
be explained in terms of the character of the income involved since
the Act readily allows basis increases for other types of appreciated
property without regard to whether the built-in gain is ordinary or
capital."' Arguably, IRD should receive no less favorable treatment
. 112
than other property. Nevertheless, under the Act, moderate estates
consisting mainly of tax-deferred retirement benefits may be unable to
take advantage of the generous basis increases that remain freely
available to much larger estates holding other forms of highly
appreciated property.
113
GIFrs T 83.1.2, at 83-3 to 83-8 (2d ed. Supp. 2001).
107 See I.R.C. § 691(a)(1).
108 See I.R.C. § 1014(c).
109 See I.R.C. § 1022(f). The 1976 Act contained a similar provision. See former
I.R.C. § 1023(b)(2)(A).
110 Distributions are generally taxed as ordinary income, even though they may
consist in large part of investment yield that would be taxed as capital gain if earned
outside a tax-deferred retirement vehicle. See I.R.C. § 72; see also Gale & Slemrod,
supra note 45, at 624 (noting "little objection, and certainly no moralistic fervor"
concerning treatment of tax-deferred retirement benefits under current law).
. See infra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing selective allocation).
Moreover, while most IRD items represent ordinary income with a basis of zero, this
is not always true; some IRD items represent capital gain (e.g., gain from sale of
property pending at death).
112 See Dodge, supra note 69, at 965 (criticizing ineligibility of IRD for basis
increase). Alternatively, if it were possible to bifurcate retirement benefits into
separate portions representing deferred compensation and investment returns, it
might be argued that at least the latter should be eligible for a basis increase.
113 See Stefan F. Tucker, Thoughts on Radical Estate and Gift Tax Reform, 91
TAX NoTEs 163, 167 (Apr. 2, 2001). The relatively disadvantageous treatment of IRD
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In stark contrast to the relatively harsh treatment of IRD, the
2001 Act retains the extraordinarily favorable treatment of life
insurance under current law, including the exclusion from the
recipient's gross income of life insurance proceeds payable at death.
114
In effect, this amounts to forgiveness of tax on any mortality gain at
death, entirely outside the scope of the carryover basis provisions. As
a result, even in the absence of the estate tax, life insurance will retain
its entrenched tax-privileged status under the new regime.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
At first glance, the concept of carryover basis seems relatively
simple and straightforward. Experience under the 1976 Act, however,
suggests that the viability of the new carryover basis regime depends
crucially on the manner of its implementation. To be sure, the 2001
Act sidesteps some of the problems that arose under the 1976 Act.
For example, the repeal of the estate tax removes the need for a
special basis adjustment for the estate tax attributable to unrealized
appreciation.' In addition, the free allocation of available basis
adjustments avoids the complexity of mandatory allocationf . 116
formulas. At the same time, however, the 2001 Act conspicuously
fails to address important issues of administration and enforcement.
Concerns about the workability of the new carryover basis regime will
may also affect asset allocation decisions. Taxpayers will have a tax incentive (as they
do under current law) to make low-risk, low-return investments with tax-deferred
retirement assets and high-risk, high-return investments with other assets, in order to
take advantage of capital gain rates and the deathtime basis step-up for the latter
category.
114 See I.R.C. § 101(a). Furthermore, the inside investment build-up during the
insured person's life is exempt from tax.
115 Although the 1976 Act allowed basis adjustments for state death taxes
attributable to unrealized appreciation in the estate, see former I.R.C. § 1023(c), (e),
the 2001 Act contains no comparable provision. This omission may be inadvertent, or
it may reflect an expectation that the states will follow the federal lead and repeal
their death taxes, making such an adjustment superfluous.
116 Nevertheless, for each asset owned at death, the amount of appreciation and
the fair market value must be known in order to determine the precise amount of the
available basis increase and make an appropriate allocation. For the basis
adjustments and mandatory allocation formulas under the 1976 Act, see former
section 1023(c) (adjustment for federal and state estate taxes attributable to
appreciation in property subject to tax), (d) (minimum basis adjustment for each asset
in proportion to share of net appreciation), (e) (adjustment for certain state death
taxes attributable to appreciation in property subject to tax), (h) (fresh start
adjustment).
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only become more pressing as the scheduled effective date draws
closer.
In general, the 2001 Act gives the executor broad discretion to
allocate available basis increases to any appreciated property owned
at death, subject to a fair market value limitation. The executor
makes the allocation on an information return setting forth specified
information about the property, the recipient, and the amount of the
allocation."' Information returns are required for "large transfers,"
i.e., property other than cash with an aggregate value of more than
$1,300,000 as well as certain gifts received by the decedent within
three years before death.118 The reporting requirements are backed
up by statutory penalties for noncompliance. 9
A. Proving Basis
Any carryover basis regime raises the issue of ascertaining the
basis of property in the decedent's hands. The issue does not arise
under current law because property passing from a decedent generally
takes a stepped-up (or stepped-down) basis in the recipient's hands
equal to the value of the property for estate tax purposes."' In
contrast, under a carryover basis regime, the decedent's basis
represents the starting point for determining the recipient's basis and
ultimately the amount of gain or loss on a subsequent sale. Since
property may pass through the hands of several generations of holders
before it is sold, a carryover basis regime may impose substantial
recordkeeping burdens over long periods of time."'
117 See I.R.C. §§ 1022(d)(3)(A), 6018.
118 See I.R.C. § 6018.
119 The statute prescribes penalties of $10,000 for failure to furnish information to
the Service with respect to a large transfer, $500 for failure to furnish information to
the Service with respect to a transfer covered by the three-year rule, and $50 for
failure to furnish required information to a recipient. See I.R.C. § 6716(a)-(b). The
statute provides an exception for "reasonable cause." See I.R.C. § 6716(c). If the
failure is due to "intentional disregard," the penalty is 5% of the fair market value of
the property involved. See I.R.C. § 6716(d).
120 See I.R.C. § 1014(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-1(a) (as amended in 1971).
121 Under the 1976 Act, if the facts necessary to determine the basis of property
in the decedent's hands were unknown, basis was presumed to be equal to "the fair
market value of such property as of the date (or approximate date) at which such
property was acquired by the decedent or by the last preceding owner in whose hands
it did not have a basis determined in whole or in part by reference to its basis in the
hands of a prior holder." Former I.R.C. § 1023(g)(3). Current law makes a similar
provision for property acquired by gift. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-1(a)(3) (as amended
in 1971).
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The practical problems of proving basis are likely to draw protests
not only from individual taxpayers but also from politically influential
interest groups involved with the administration of decedents' estates.
Critics of the 1976 Act emphasized the difficulty of determining the
basis of property held for many years with specific reference to
closely-held businesses, farms, improved real estate, and tangible
personal property. They insisted that individual taxpayers could not
realistically be expected to maintain adequate basis records of each
item of property owned at death. Furthermore, they argued that in
the absence of such records the burden of reconstructing basis after
death would lead to intolerable increases in the cost and delay of/ • . .• 122
routine estate administration. These objections played an important
part in bringing about the retroactive repeal of the 1976 carryover
basis legislation, and they carry as much weight today as they did
twenty-five years ago.
In response, defenders of carryover basis have pointed out that
individual taxpayers are already responsible for maintaining basis
records for purposes of lifetime dispositions; even under current law,
they cannot know for certain whether they will hold specific property
until death; and in any event, once the new carryover basis regime
takes effect, it is perfectly reasonable to expect them to comply with
recordkeeping requirements.'23  Nevertheless, critics are likely to
argue, as they did in 1976, that it is especially unfair to impose new
recordkeeping burdens on taxpayers who acquired property many
years ago with the expectation of holding it until death. 24 As a
practical matter, requirements that are widely perceived as unduly
intrusive and burdensome may.prove to be unenforceable.
On the merits, defenders of carryover basis may argue that the
difficulties of determining basis are simply overstated. Even if a
122 See Carryover Basis Provisions: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 96th Cong. 43, 45, 47-48 (1979) [hereinafter Carryover Basis Provisions]
(statement of American Bankers Association); id. at 111, 113-14 (statement of
American College of Probate Counsel); id. at 162, 168-69, 173 (statement of
American Bar Association). See generally Zelenak, supra note 9, at 388-94.
123 See Carryover Basis Provisions, supra note 122, at 9, 12-14 (statement of
Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy); id. at 178, 180-
85 (statement of Paul R. McDaniel). Or, to put the point more bluntly, failure to
keep required records does not mean that the requirement is unreasonable.
124 The 2001 Act provides no transitional relief similar to the 1976 Act's "fresh
start" basis adjustment for property acquired before the date of enactment. If
carryover basis is viewed as a replacement for the estate tax, this omission makes
sense. A fresh start adjustment, coupled with estate tax repeal, would represent an
enormous windfall for holders of property with pre-effective date appreciation.
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decedent failed to keep detailed records, it may be possible to
reconstruct the decedent's basis from other sources: land records and
mortgage lenders in the case of real property; tax returns and
corporate books in the case of closely-held business interests; brokers
and other intermediaries in the case of financial assets; and insurance
records in the case of jewelry and collectibles.' z Nevertheless, such
records may be incomplete, unavailable, or fail to reflect adjustments
to the decedent's original cost basis. For example, additional
information may be necessary to make accurate basis determinations
with respect to improved real property, or shares of stocks or mutual
funds acquired in small increments over time pursuant to a
reinvestment plan.
For some types of property, the burden of determining basis may
be alleviated by a special exemption. For example, the 2001 Act
expands the $250,000 gain exclusion for principal residences to apply
to qualifying property acquired from a decedent. 126  A separate,
limited exemption might plausibly be allowed in the case of tangible
personal property held for personal use (as opposed to business or
investment purposes), to avoid the cost and inconvenience of
identifying and reporting numerous items with trivial amounts of
appreciation.' The 2001 Act, however, provides no such exemption,
perhaps on the ground that such property is unlikely to appreciate in
value, and any decline would be nondeductible. As a result, executors
may find themselves spending inordinate time and effort sifting
through personal and household effects in search of items with
potential appreciation (e.g., jewelry, wedding presents, collectibles,
and the contents of the proverbial trunk in the attic). More likely,
though, such property may simply slip through the system uncounted
and unreported.
It is true, of course, that repeal of the estate tax will reduce the
costs of administration and compliance directly attributable to
preparing and filing estate tax returns, as well as some related costs of
planning and drafting. The administration of decedents' estates will
125 See Carryover Basis Provisions, supra note 122, at 9, 12-14 (statement of
Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy); id. at 178, 181-
83 (statement of Paul R. McDaniel)..
126 See I.R.C. § 121(d)(9) (effective for property acquired from decedents dying
after 2009).
127 Cf. former I.R.C. § 1023(b)(3) ($10,000 exclusion for personal and household
effects). The purpose of such an exemption would be "to eliminate the burdensome
task of determining whether or not innumerable and often trivial personal effects
have appreciated value." Graetz, supra note 51, at 843-44; see also Zelenak, supra
note 9, at 425-28.
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still involve substantial costs, 2 8 however, and the efforts required of
taxpayers, executors, and beneficiaries to collect and maintain basis
records under the new carryover basis regime may well prove even129
more onerous. Some of the groups that complained so loudly of the
burdens of proving basis under the 1976 Act have already begun to
express similar reservations about the new carryover basis regime, and
there is no reason to expect that their concerns will diminish with the
passage of time13°
B. Information Reporting
The 2001 Act imposes new information reporting requirements
which, if diligently followed, may prove even more burdensome for
executors than filing estate tax returns. On the information return,
which is due on the same date as the decedent's final return, the
executor must provide detailed information with respect to any
property acquired from the decedent, including the name of the
recipient, the fair market value of the property at death, the
decedent's adjusted basis and holding period, and the amount of any
basis increase allocated to the property.' This information is
considerably more extensive than the disclosure required on an estate
128 See, e.g., Charles Davenport & Jay A. Soled, Enlivening the Death-Tax Death-
Talk, 84 TAX NOTES 591, 621 (July 26, 1999) ("Even without an estate tax, assets must
be marshalled, debts must be paid, heirs must be pacified, property must be valued,
special orders may be sought, asset schedules must be prepared, claims and debts
must be listed, income and expenses must be tracked, and many costs are incurred
unrelated to the estate tax.").
129 See Roby B. Sawyers, Restructuring Estate and Gift Taxes, 54 NAT'L TAX J.
579, 587 (2001) (noting likelihood of increased administration costs due to retention
of accountants, lawyers and other professionals "to review a lifetime's accumulation
of bills, checks, insurance policies, and other records to determine the acquisition
dates and prices of a multitude of assets" and calculate bases).
130 See AICPA Tax Division, Reform of the Estate and Gift Tax System, 91 TAX
NOTES 307, 323 (Apr. 9, 2001) (noting "significant problems" of determining basis for
collectibles, other personal property and household goods, mutual funds and listed
securities); President's Tax Relief Proposals: Individual Income Tax Rates: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 103 (2001) (statement of
American Bankers Association) (describing carryover basis as an "administrative
nightmare" and noting increased administration costs and burden of determining
basis); Tucker, supra note 113, at 165-66.
131 See I.R.C. § 6018(c). In addition, the executor must report the recipient's
taxpayer identification number, information concerning the character of any gain on
sale of the property, and any other information prescribed by regulations. See id.
The executor must also furnish a separate statement containing similar information to
the recipient of the property. See I.R.C. § 6018(e).
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tax return under current law. For example, while disclosure of the
decedent's basis and holding period is essential to the operation of the
new carryover basis regime, this represents a completely new task for
the executor. Even assuming that the executor is able to gather or
reconstruct all of the required information, 3 2 doing so will require
substantial time and effort and will inevitably increase the cost of
administering decedents' estates. Compliance will be especially
difficult in the case of a pecuniary bequest since the executor may not
identify the particular assets which will fund the bequest until long
after the deadline for filing the information return.
At first glance, the information reporting requirements may seem
to apply only to a relatively small group of estates worth more than
$1,300,000;... however, the requirements are much more far-reaching.
Initially, the executor must identify all property (other than cash)
acquired from the decedent to see whether the aggregate fair market
value exceeds the statutory threshold.3" Unfortunately, aside from
the core category of probate assets passing by bequest, devise, or
inheritance, the statutory definition of "[p]roperty acquired from the
decedent" is quite vague. Although the term evidently does not
embrace all property included in the gross estate under current law, its
application to certain transfers made during life 116 or outside the
132 If some of the required information is unavailable, the executor must
nevertheless describe the property and identify each person holding a legal or
beneficial interest therein. See I.R.C. § 6018(b)(4).
133 For information reporting purposes, the statutory threshold is equal to
$1,300,000, "the dollar amount applicable under section 1022(b)(2)(B) (without
regard to [the adjustment for certain loss carryovers and built-in losses under] section
1022(b)(2)(C))." I.R.C. § 6018(b)(1). It is unclear whether the threshold amount is
subject to the inflation adjustment under section 1022(d)(4).
134 The statute expressly excludes cash. See I.R.C. § 6018(b)(1). This may reflect
the notion that the carryover basis provisions cannot apply to cash. Nevertheless, if
the threshold is intended to identify "[large transfers," as the statutory heading
implies, it seems odd to exclude cash. Apparently an estate consisting of $1 billion of
cash and $1,000,000 of appreciated securities would not constitute a "[l]arge transfer"
for information reporting purposes.
135 In addition to property passing by bequest, devise or inheritance, the
definition includes property transferred by the decedent during life to a "qualified
revocable trust" (or any other trust subject to a reserved power to "alter, amend, or
terminate") and property "passing from the decedent by reason of death" without
consideration. I.R.C. § 1022(e). The same definition applies for purposes of the
information reporting requirements. See I.R.C. § 6018(d).
136 For example, it is unclear whether the definition includes a trust that can be
revoked by the decedent only with the consent of an adverse party; a trust that can be
altered, amended or terminated by the decedent only with the consent of another
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probate system at death 137 remains unclear. The definition of property
"owned" by the decedent at death, which determines which property
. . 138
is eligible for a basis increase at death, is even sketchier. The result
is a pastiche of concepts borrowed from the provisions of current law
allowing a deathtime basis step-up,3 9 which lacks coherence in the
absence of the estate tax.14°
Regardless of whether the $1,300,000 threshold is met, the
executor must report certain gifts of property received by the
141decedent within three years before death. Specifically, the reporting
requirement applies to "appreciated property acquired from the
decedent" that is ineligible for a basis increase due to the three-year
rule 142 and that was required to be included on a gift tax return.' This
provision is apparently intended to encourage disclosure of gifts
triggering the three-year rule by invoking penalties for failure to
report such gifts on the information return.
Although the reporting requirements nominally apply only to
person; or a revocable transfer not in trust (e.g., a conveyance of land subject to a
retained life estate and power of revocation).
137 Presumably, "property passing from the decedent by reason of death"
includes a nonprobate transfer such as a pay-on-death beneficiary designation. See
I.R.C. § 1022(e)(3). Less obviously, this catch-all term may also include property held
in joint tenancy (or tenancy by the entirety), at least to the extent such property is
treated as "owned by the decedent" at death and hence eligible for a basis step-up
under section 1022(b) or (c). See H.R. REP. No. 107-37, at 26-27 (2001); cf. I.R.C.
§ 1022(d)(1)(B)(i) (treating one-half of property as owned at death in case of marital
joint tenancy, or, in case of other joint tenancy, a proportional share attributable to
consideration furnished by decedent). Apparently, any nonprobate transfer that falls
outside the statutory definition is treated as a transfer by gift subject to section 1015,
with the result that the property is not eligible for a basis increase under section 1022.
138 The statutory definition specifically includes a portion of property held in
joint tenancy (or tenancy by the entirety), a "qualified revocable trust," and a
surviving spouse's one-half share of community property; it does not include property
subject to a power of appointment. See I.R.C. § 1022(d)(1)(A)-(B).
139 See I.R.C. § 1014(b)(1), (3), (6).
140 For purposes of the deathtime basis step-up under current law, the definition
of "property acquired from the decedent" generally includes property includible in
the decedent's gross estate. See I.R.C. § 1014(b)(9). With the repeal of the estate tax,
this provision loses its significance. An earlier carryover basis bill, approved by
Congress but vetoed by President Clinton in 2000, defined "property acquired from a
decedent" by reference to the concept of the gross estate under current law. See
Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. 8, 106th Cong. § 103 (proposed §
1022(b)(1)).
141 See I.R.C. § 6018(b)(2).
142 See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
143 See I.R.C. § 6018(b)(2)(B).
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estates above the $1,300,000 threshold and gifts subject to the three-
year rule, the practical impact of the requirements is much broader.
In fact, an executor must file an information return in order to make a
valid allocation of any allowable basis increase regardless of the
amount of property involved." Thus, the technical reporting
requirements for allocating a basis increase are the same for a $10,000
estate as for a $20,000,000 estate.14 ' This represents a substantial (and
probably unintended) new administrative burden for estates that
receive a full basis step-up under current law without having to file an
estate tax return. Moreover, if no executor (or administrator) is
appointed, the recipients themselves may be required to file
information returns. 14 Especially in cases where the basis or value of
particular property is uncertain, there is a serious possibility of
inconsistent reporting by several recipients with conflicting interests.
Even assuming full compliance on the part of executors, the 2001
Act fails to establish a procedure for auditing information returns or
finally determining an adjusted basis that would be binding on a
recipient in a subsequent sale of property acquired from a decedent.
With the repeal of the estate tax, no tax will be imposed by reason of
an individual taxpayer's death, and there will be no pressing reason
for the Service to review the accuracy or completeness of information
returns submitted by executors. Indeed, there appears to be no
procedure for finally and conclusively establishing the basis of
property acquired from a decedent prior to the eventual disposition of
the property.147  The recipient of such property, though entitled to
receive a separate information return from the executor, has no
opportunity to challenge the accuracy or completeness of the adjusted
basis shown on the return. Indeed, nothing in the 2001 Act gives
144 See I.R.C. § 1022(d)(3)(A) (providing for allocation of basis increase by
executor on information return).
145 The executor is also required to furnish similar information to the recipients,
who as a practical matter must in turn keep records to prove basis in the event of a
subsequent disposition. See I.R.C. § 6018(e).
146 The statute defines "executor" to include a decedent's executor or
administrator or, if none is appointed, qualified and acting in the United States, "any
person in actual or constructive possession of any property of the decedent." I.R.C.
§ 7701(a)(47). See also I.R.C. § 6018(b)(4) (requiring information return in certain
cases by person with legal or beneficial interest).
147 See Dodge, supra note 69, at 969 (noting that "any determination of basis
reported on an information return would not become final until the statute of
limitations runs on the reported gain or loss generated by such basis"). The regular
deficiency procedures do not apply to assessment or collection of penalties under
section 6716. See I.R.C. § 6716(e).
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binding effect to the information furnished by the executor in
determining the recipient's adjusted basis. Apparently, the recipient
is free to make an independent (and possibly inconsistent) calculation
of adjusted basis in property acquired from the decedent for purposes
of determining gain or loss on a subsequent disposition. Without an
effective mechanism for conclusively determining the basis of
property acquired from the decedent (as adjusted for any allowable
increase at death) and giving binding effect to that determination of
basis on a subsequent disposition, the entire carryover basis regime
collapses like a house of cards.
C. Allocation of Basis Increase
Another problem lurking beneath the surface of the new
carryover basis regime involves the method of allocating basis
increases to property owned at death. The 2001 Act gives the
executor broad discretion to allocate any available basis increase to
appreciated property owned at death, subject to the limitation that the
resulting adjusted basis may not exceed the property's fair market
value at death.t48  This represents a sharp departure from the
mandatory allocation formula approach of the 1976 Act, which
implicitly made the basis adjustment for each asset depend on a
precise calculation of the basis and fair market value of each
appreciated asset in the decedent's estate. 149 Although the 2001 Act
avoids some of the problems of a mandatory allocation formula, it
raises several new pitfalls and opportunities for executors and
beneficiaries.
The discretionary allocation approach invites executors to make
tax-motivated allocations that maximize gain deferral and minimize
the potential income tax liability of beneficiaries as a group.
Executors will have a powerful incentive to allocate any available
basis increase selectively to property with built-in ordinary gain,
property passing to recipients in high income tax brackets, or property
expected to be sold shortly after death.15° The new regime does not
restrict the use of such techniques, nor does it provide a default
148 See I.R.C. §§ 1022(d)(3)(A) (authorizing executor to allocate basis increase on
information return), 1022(d)(2) (specifying fair market value limitation).
149 See former I.R.C. § 1023(d) (providing minimum basis adjustment for each
asset in proportion to its share of net appreciation).
150 See Dodge, supra note 69, at 964 (noting problem of selective allocation of
basis increase). However, such allocations cannot be made to items of IRD, which
are ineligible for any basis increase. See I.R.C. § 1022(f).
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allocation rule in cases where the executor fails to act affirmatively.
Indeed, in the case of a small estate where no executor is appointed
and no information return is filed, the basis increase may be lost
entirely. The legislative history gives no indication that the drafters
gave any consideration to the implications of unlimited discretion.
Furthermore, the allocation provisions fail to address the problem
of "suspended basis" arising when the executor sells appreciated
property (or distributes the property in kind to satisfy a pecuniary
bequest"') after death and before making a final allocation of basis
112increase. Assuming that the sale cannot be delayed, the executor is
in the awkward position of making important administrative decisions
- which property to sell, whether to make a provisional allocation of
basis increase - without full information about the nature and extent
of the decedent's property or the optimal overall allocation of
available basis increases. As further information becomes available,
the executor may have to review and revise provisional allocation
decisions. A beneficiary who receives a simple distribution of
appreciated property in kind cannot know the adjusted basis of the
property until the executor files an information return reflecting a
final allocation of basis increase. 54  Given the likely delay in
determining the fair market value and basis of all the decedent's
property and making a final allocation of basis increases, the estate
and the beneficiaries may find themselves routinely forced to seek
extensions for filing their respective income tax returns.
Finally, the allocation provisions pose new dilemmas for
151 In the case of an in-kind distribution of appreciated property to satisfy a
pecuniary bequest, the 2001 Act limits the estate's recognized gain to post-death
appreciation (i.e., the increase in fair market value from the date of death to the date
of distribution). See I.R.C. § 1040(a) (effective for estates of decedents dying after
2009). This provision, however, does not solve the problem of suspended basis. The
recipient takes a carryover basis in the property, including any deathtime basis
increase allocated by the executor, increased by any gain recognized on the
distribution. See I.R.C. § 1040(c). Thus, the basis of the property in the recipient's
hands still depends on knowing the amount of any basis increase finally allocated to
the property.
152 This problem arose in even more acute form under the 1976 Act, which
required an allocation of basis increase among all appreciated assets in proportion to
the net appreciation in each asset. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
153 Even the total amount of the available basis increase may be uncertain until
the decedent's built-in section 165 losses are ascertained. See I.R.C.
§ 1022(b)(2)(C)(ii).
154 This may prove inconvenient if the recipient sells the property or claims
depreciation deductions by reference to the property's (as yet unascertainable)
adjusted basis.
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executors in discharging their fiduciary duties under state law. In
administering a decedent's estate, an executor owes fundamental
duties to the decedent's beneficiaries, including the duties of loyalty,I515615
care, and impartiality."' Even under current law, an executor may
find it difficult to reconcile these duties, especially in making tax
elections.'58 In giving the executor virtually unlimited discretion to
allocate basis increases, the 2001 Act makes matters worse. To
minimize the overall tax burden on the beneficiaries, the executor
may be inclined to allocate basis increase to property passing to a
beneficiary in a high income tax bracket. If this allocation has the
incidental effect of leaving another beneficiary with a lower basis (and
more built-in gain), the executor may be charged with favoring the
former beneficiary at the expense of the latter in violation of the duty
of impartiality. 5 9 A variation of the same problem arises if the
executor makes in-kind distributions of properties with the same fair
market value but different amounts of built-in gain to satisfy
equivalent pecuniary bequests. The recipient of the low-basis
property may insist that the duty of impartiality requires that the
executor allocate any available basis increase in a manner that
equalizes built-in gain or at least reduces disparities between the two
beneficiaries. The recipient of the high-basis property, of course, is
likely to take a different view. In an estate comprising many different
assets and beneficiaries with diverse tax characteristics, it may be
155 In general, the duty of loyalty requires that the executor act solely for the
benefit of the beneficiaries and avoid transactions tainted by self-dealing or conflict of
interest. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 170 (1959).
156 The duty of care requires that the executor exercise due care and skill,
including filing tax returns and making tax elections. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 174 (1959). The executor may delegate some of these functions to agents,
but remains responsible for exercising due care in selecting and monitoring agents.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 171 (1992).
157 The duty of impartiality requires that the executor treat beneficiaries fairly
and avoid favoring one beneficiary or class of beneficiaries at the expense of others.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959).
158 For example, under current law the executor may be able to reduce the
overall tax burden by electing to deduct administration expenses on the estate's
income tax return rather than on the estate tax return. For fiduciary accounting
purposes, such expenses may be charged against principal, even though the income
tax deduction increases net income. To avoid a windfall for the income beneficiaries,
the executor may be authorized to make an equitable adjustment in favor of the
remainder beneficiaries. See UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 506, 7B U.L.A. 131
(1997) (authorizing equitable adjustments).
159 The duty of loyalty may also be implicated if the high-bracket beneficiary
happens to be the same person as (or someone closely affiliated with) the executor.
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impossible to reconcile the competing interests of all beneficiaries
satisfactorily.16°  Although estate administration often involves
unavoidable tensions among beneficiaries with divergent interests, the
advent of discretionary allocations under the new regime will
aggravate those tensions and expose executors to an increased risk of
liability.
Executors will most likely respond by pressing for exoneration
provisions in wills to shield them from complaints by disappointed
beneficiaries. Even broad exoneration provisions, however, will not
prevent beneficiaries from second-guessing the executor's
discretionary allocations of basis increase. The executor in turn may
be obliged to investigate various alternative allocations in search of an
optimal tax result, thereby driving up the costs of routine estate
administration. Those costs will rise even more sharply if a
disgruntled beneficiary resorts to litigation. Increased costs will
exacerbate the executor's dilemma since cost containment represents
an important component of the basic duty of care. In sum, the
executor's broad discretion to allocate basis increases under the 2001
Act may well prove even more cumbersome, time-consuming, and
wasteful in terms of estate administration costs than either the
mandatory allocation formulas of the 1976 Act or the estate tax
reporting requirements of current law.
V. A STAND-ALONE GIFT TAX
Although the 2001 Act repeals the estate tax (and the generation-
skipping transfer tax) in conjunction with the introduction of the new
carryover basis regime, it leaves the gift tax in place. This
development is both unprecedented and puzzling, for the gift tax has
traditionally been viewed as an important but subordinate buttress to
the estate tax. Whatever the underlying rationale, a stand-alone gift
tax fits uneasily with the new regime and raises serious questions
concerning the long-term viability of the 2001 legislative package.
For many years, the gift tax has functioned as a backstop to the
estate tax, ensuring that the estate tax base cannot be too easily
eroded by large lifetime transfers.161 The estate and gift taxes are
160 See Dodge, supra note 69, at 972 ("Lots of legatees are going to be
unhappy.").
161 See Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939). In addition, the
gift tax serves as a backstop to the progressive rate structure of the income tax. See
H.R. REP. No. 72-708, at 28 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 457, 462; S. REP.
No. 72-665 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 496, 504; see also Dickman v.
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"closely related both in structure and in purpose., 162 Since 1976, both
. 163
taxes have shared a common set of "unified" rates and exemptions.
Nevertheless, the correlation between the two taxes remains
imperfect. For example, notwithstanding the unified rate schedule,
the gift tax is effectively imposed at lower rates than the estate tax,
due to the difference between the "tax-exclusive" base of the former
and the "tax-inclusive" base of the latter. 4  This systematic
preference for lifetime gifts, though conceptually untidy, has
occasionally been defended as a useful subsidy that encourages the
flow of business and investment capital from older generations into
the hands of "younger, more vigorous owners."' 65 In response, it has
been observed that dynastic wealth is often held in long-term trusts
and that a shift from older to younger beneficiaries is unlikely to have
any impact on the low-risk, low-return investment strategies
traditionally pursued by trustees. 66 The empirical evidence, though
sparse, suggests a surprisingly low level of taxpayer responsiveness to
the tax incentives for making lifetime gifts.1
67
Evidently, a stand-alone gift tax turns the argument for
subsidizing lifetime gifts on its head. In the absence of the estate tax,
the gift tax will discourage taxpayers from making substantial lifetime
gifts and reinforce their deep-rooted instinct to hold on to their
accumulated wealth until death.1M The incentive to retain wealth will
Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 338-39 (1984).
162 Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 286 (1933); see also Sanford's Estate, 308
U.S. at 44; Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 311-13 (1945).
163 See I.R.C. §§ 2001(c) (estate tax rates), 2010 (estate tax unified credit), 2502
(gift tax rates), 2505 (gift tax unified credit). The 2001 Act freezes the gift tax
exemption at $1,000,000, while raising the estate tax exemption to $3,500,000 by 2009.
See I.R.C. §§ 2010(c), 2505(a)(1).
164 See Harry L. Gutman, A Comment on the ABA Tax Section Task Force
Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 653, 656-57 (1988).
165 See Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Taxation, Task Force on Transfer Tax
Restructuring, Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 395, 403 (1988);
Paul B. Stephan III, A Comment on Transfer Tax Reform, 72 VA. L. REV. 1471, 1487-
88 (1986) (suggesting that tax preference for lifetime gifts may "nudge wealth out of
the hands of aging owners and into the possession of younger, more productive
entrepreneurs").
166 See Gutman, supra note 164, at 656-57.
167 See James Poterba, Estate and Gift Taxes and Incentives for Inter Vivos Giving
in the US, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 237, 252-59 (2001).
168 Presumably, the relinquishment or termination of ownership or retained
powers at death will not constitute a deemed transfer for gift tax purposes. See Treas.
Reg. § 25.2511-2(f) (as amended in 1999) (treating relinquishment or termination of
retained power "occurring otherwise than by the death of the donor" as deemed
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be strengthened by the prospect of a limited basis step-up at death;
the large exemptions from the new carryover basis regime have no
counterpart in the income tax treatment of lifetime gifts.1
69
Accordingly, the distinction between lifetime and deathtime transfers
will assume new importance. Deathtime transfers will enjoy an
unequivocal tax advantage over lifetime gifts since they will escape
transfer tax altogether and at the same time be eligible for a basis
increase. Thus, the 2001 Act will likely have the perverse effects of
deterring lifetime gifts and exacerbating lock-in.
The obvious question is why the 2001 Act preserves the gift tax at
all. One possible answer is that the gift tax is necessary to protect the
integrity of the progressive income tax rate structure by discouraging
bracket-shifting techniques.170 For example, in the absence of a gift
tax, a high-bracket taxpayer might give appreciated property to a
lower-bracket friend or family member with the expectation that the
donee would sell the property, pay income tax (at a relatively low
rate) on the resulting gain and eventually return the after-taxS 171
proceeds to the donor. Interestingly, the original bill passed by the
House called for repeal of the gift tax, but it also contained an anti-
abuse provision authorizing the Service to disregard a gift of property
172for income tax purposes in order to prevent income tax avoidance.
The gift tax was reinstated by a Senate amendment, and it survived in
the final version of the bill approved by the conference committee.7 3
Two substantive changes included in the 2001 Act seem to
transfer, and noting that the gift tax is "confined to transfers by living owners").
169 Compare I.R.C. § 1022(b), (c) (allowing basis increase for property owned at
death), with I.R.C. § 1015(a), (d) (providing carryover basis for lifetime gifts, with
limited basis adjustment for gift tax attributable to net appreciation).
170 See John Buckley, Estate and Gift Taxes: What Will Congress Do Next?, 91
TAX NOTES 2069, 2070 (June 18, 2001) ("Retention of the gift tax is an attempt to
prevent widespread income tax avoidance.").
171 Similarly, the donor might seek to reduce income tax liability by transferring
income-producing property abroad or by using an "adverse party" to avoid grantor
status for a transfer in trust. See Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 53, at 574-75; John
Buckley, Transfer Tax Repeal Proposals: Implications for the Income Tax, 90 TAX
NoTEs 539 (Jan. 22, 2001).
172 See Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. 8, 106th Cong. § 402(e)
(proposed I.R.C. § 7701(n)). The House bill also called for "a study of opportunities
for avoidance of the income tax, if any, and potential increases [sic] in income tax
revenues by reason of enactment of the bill." H.R. REP. No. 107-37, at 31 (2001); cf.
id. at 195-96 (views of dissenting committee members, noting problem of income tax
avoidance under original House bill).
173 See H.R. REP. No. 107-84, at 189, 191 (2001). The anti-abuse rule proposed in
the original House bill was also dropped in the conference agreement.
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confirm the notion of the gift tax as a deterrent to income shifting.
First, in 2010, simultaneously with the repeal of the estate tax, the top
marginal gift tax rate is scheduled to drop to 35%,174 precisely
matching the top marginal individual income tax rate.75 Second, the
Act rewrites the gift tax rules for determining when and to what
extent a transfer of property in trust is complete. In place of the
current rules, which reflect a patchwork of early Supreme Court
176rulings, the Act announces a single overriding rule: a "transfer in
trust shall be treated as a transfer of property by gift, unless the trust
is treated as wholly owned by the donor or the donor's spouse under
[the grantor trust rules of sections 671-679]." 177 By conforming the gift
tax completion rule to the existing income tax grantor trust rules, the
Act in effect imposes the gift tax as a toll charge on any transfer that
shifts income tax liability in whole or in part from the donor (or the
178donor's spouse) to another taxpayer.
Aside from technical issues, the decision to retain the gift tax
while repealing the estate tax raises a fundamental question of policy.
Simply put, there is little reason to believe that a stand-alone gift tax
represents an appropriate response to concerns about income shifting.
In part, this is because the scope of the income-shifting problem has
dwindled in recent years as individual income tax rates have become
increasingly compressed. In part, it is because the sheer complexity
and administrative burden of a stand-alone gift tax (combined with
serious enforcement problems under current law) seem grossly
disproportionate to the goal of deterring high-bracket parents from
using gifts of property to shift income into the hands of low-bracket
children. 179 And in part, it is because the structure of the gift tax, with
its generous exclusions and exemptions, reaches only a very small
174 See I.R.C. § 2502(a)(2) (gift tax rates for gifts made after 2009). In effect, the
first $1,000,000 of cumulative gifts are exempt from gift tax, and subsequent gifts are
taxed at a flat marginal rate of 35%. See I.R.C. §§ 2502(a)(2) (specifying 35% rate for
cumulative gifts over $500,000), 2505(a)(1) (allowing $1,000,000 exemption).
175 See I.R.C. § 1(i)(2).
176 See Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-1 (as amended in 1997), 25.2511-2 (as amended in
1999).
177 See I.R.C. § 2511(c) (effective for gifts made after 2009).
178 The new rule appears to be aimed at a narrow category of transfers in trust
that are wholly or partially complete for income tax purposes but not for gift tax
purposes.
179 Indeed, in view of the relatively compressed rate brackets, it might also be
questioned whether provisions such as the grantor trust rules and the "kiddie tax" are
worth retaining.
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fraction of lifetime gifts.18 On the whole, a stand-alone gift tax seems
remarkably cumbersome and ineffective as a means of combating
income shifting.
A stand-alone gift tax also creates a substantial disincentive for
lifetime gifts. A much more direct and effective method of reaching
wealth transfers would be to repeal the income tax exclusion for gifts
and bequests' 8' and to include such transfers in the recipient's gross
112income. Admittedly, this approach runs counter to the basic
premise of a carryover basis regime, for it implies that the recipient
would take the transferred property with a fair-market-value basis
(reflecting the amount included in gross income) and that the
183transferor would realize any built-in gain at the time of the transfer.
Furthermore, regardless of its merits as a conceptual matter, the
notion of a double-level income tax on gifts and bequests is clearly a
nonstarter as a practical matter in the current political climate.
Perhaps the most convincing explanation for the persistence of
the gift tax under the new regime is rooted not in policy but in politics.
It seems possible, indeed likely, that a stand-alone gift tax is not really
intended to mitigate the revenue loss resulting from estate tax repeal
or to deter income shifting through lifetime gifts.18 Instead, the gift
tax may represent merely a tactical measure to disguise the impact of
the new regime and to disarm critics without seriously affecting
revenue or behavior. Under the new carryover basis regime, few
taxpayers will pay any gift tax at all. Most routine lifetime gifts will be
180 See I.R.C. §§ 2503(b) (excluding over $10,000 of annual gifts to each donee),
2505(a) (allowing credit to offset gift tax on first $1,000,000 of cumulative taxable
gifts).
181 See I.R.C. § 102.
192 See John K. McNulty, Fundamental Alternatives to Present Transfer Tax
Systems, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 85, 95 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr.
ed., 1977) (describing an income tax on gifts and bequests as an "elegantly simple and
economically attractive alternative" to the estate and gift taxes); see also HENRY C.
SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 125-47 (1938); Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond
Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1177, 1182-95 (1978).
183 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 10, at 546-53 (pointing out that "treating
gifts and bequests as income to the recipient appears to be feasible primarily, and
perhaps exclusively, in the context of a full double level tax model").
184 Cf. Paull's March Memo to W&M Counsel on Estate and Gift Tax Estimates,
TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 26, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2001
TNT 60-43) (noting "significant revenue effects that result from a variety of income
tax avoidance opportunities made possible by the repeal of the estate and gift tax"
and suggesting that revenue loss could be reduced by adding "provisions to prevent
income tax avoidance and to enhance compliance").
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nontaxable, due to the exclusions for annual gifts of over $10,000 for
each recipient and unlimited amounts for medical and educational
expenses, and all but a handful of larger gifts will be fully covered by
the $1,000,000 lifetime exemption. Taxpayers will have irresistible
tax incentives to hold appreciated property until death to avoid the
gift tax and obtain substantial basis increases. Even under current
law, gift tax compliance is notoriously uneven, depending to a large
extent on voluntary disclosure to take advantage of limitations on
assessment 186 or on mandatory disclosure in connection with the estate
tax return. 187 With the repeal of the estate tax, there is no reason to
suppose that the gift tax would flourish; the more likely prediction is
that it would atrophy through disuse and would eventually be
repealed as a dead letter.188 From this perspective, leaving a stand-
alone gift tax on the books may represent no more than an empty
gesture.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the abstract, a carryover basis regime for inherited property
represents a plausible alternative to the unlimited basis step-up
allowed under current law. Properly designed and implemented, a
carryover basis regime could reduce existing disparities in the income
tax treatment of transfers made during life and at death. 18 But, as
demonstrated by the experiment with carryover basis under the 1976
Act, in the real world an ideal version of carryover basis is unlikely to
be enacted, and a defective version is unlikely to survive for long. The
carryover basis regime under the 2001 Act is far from ideal. Gutted
by huge exemptions, marred by vagueness and complexity, and
hobbled by unacknowledged problems of implementation, the new
carryover basis regime may be damaged beyond repair even before it
takes effect. Given the trivial amount of revenue that it would raise,
the disproportionate costs of administration, and the lack of workable
enforcement mechanisms, it is difficult to imagine that the new
185 See I.R.C. §§ 2503(b) (annual exclusion), 2503(e) (medical and educational
exclusion), 2505(a) (gift tax unified credit).
186 See I.R.C. §§ 2504(c) (limitation on revaluation of gifts), 6501(c)(9) (exception
to open limitation period for adequate disclosure on gift tax return).
187 Indeed, many gift tax cases come to light only after the donor's death in
connection with an audit of the estate tax return.
188 See Buckley, supra note 170, at 2070 (expressing "doubt as to whether
retention of the gift tax in an environment with no estate tax is a politically viable
answer to the income tax avoidance issue").
189 See Joulfaian, supra note 90, at 642.
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carryover basis regime will actually come into force in 2010.
This should come as no surprise. The 2001 Act reflects a
relentless determination on the part of its abolitionist sponsors to
repeal the estate tax. Next to this primary goal, the carryover basis
provisions play only a minor supporting role. Although the
abolitionists thus far have achieved only temporary repeal, they have
already launched a fresh campaign to override the sunset provision
and make estate tax repeal permanent. If they succeed, it is entirely
foreseeable, and perhaps inevitable, that the new carryover basis
regime and the stand-alone gift tax will disappear as well.
Opponents of the abolitionist agenda propose to retain the estate
tax with substantially higher exemptions and lower rates. Their
defense of the estate tax is lukewarm, for they recognize well the
shortcomings of the current system. Instead, they view the estate tax
as less objectionable than alternative options such as carryover basis
or a deathtime gains tax that would raise far less revenue and
contribute much less to the progressivity of the overall tax system.
Their proposals, however, have encountered vigorous opposition from
the abolitionists, who correctly perceive that any immediate increase
in the estate tax exemption would siphon off political support for
complete repeal.
The abolitionist strategy behind the 2001 Act represents an
enormous fiscal and political gamble. The Act sets in motion a series
of tax cuts that have already exhausted the short-term non-social-
security surplus and promise, if they become permanent, to produce
even larger revenue losses in the future.' 9° It is not clear whether the
predominant long-term effect of the Act will be to constrain
• . 191
government spending or merely to increase deficit spending, thereby
•• 192
shifting the resulting tax burden to future generations. It is clear,
190 See Auerbach et al., supra note 18, at 1653 (criticizing policy of "[i]ncreasing
defense spending while sustaining lower taxes for high-income households" as a "guns
and caviar" approach).
191 See State of the Union, supra note 11, at 354 ("Unrestrained government
spending is a dangerous road to deficits, so we must take a different path .... You
see, the growing surplus exists because taxes are too high and Government is charging
more than it needs. The people of America have been overcharged, and on their
behalf, I am here asking for a refund.").
192 See Gale & Potter, supra note 4, at 144 ("[Tlax cuts are not simply a matter of
returning unneeded or unused funds to taxpayers, but rather a choice to require
other, future taxpayers to cover the long-term deficit, which the tax cut significantly
exacerbates .... Thus, the issue is not whether taxpayers should have their tax
payments returned, but rather which taxpayers - current or future - will be required
to pay for the spending obligations incurred by current and past taxpayers.").
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however, that the abolitionists do not have time on their side. As the
mounting revenue costs and skewed distributional effects of the Act
become clearer, the prospects for making the tax cuts permanent are
likely to fade. As the federal budget comes under increasing pressure
to meet the costs of preserving social security and medicare while
prosecuting a global war on terrorism, the estate tax may reassert its
traditional role as a small but important - perhaps indispensable -
component of the overall tax system."'
193 See Gale & Slemrod, supra note 7, at 58 ("[Tlhe estate tax may well play a
small but important role in the government's portfolio of tax instruments.").
